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WHITE PAPER ON BLACK BACKGROUND

by Felix Morley

On April 17, 1934, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office (Mr. Eiji Amau) made a public statement in Tokyo which our Department of State immediately challenged. Basing his argument on the Lansing-Ishii Agreement of 1917, Mr. Amau announced that Japan had "special responsibilities in East Asia" and therefore proposed to develop its political guardianship over contiguous areas in China.

The rejoinder of Secretary of State Cordell Hull was immediate and determined. In a carefully worded note, delivered in Tokyo on April 29, 1934, Mr. Hull restated certain "generally accepted principles of international law". He explained again why his Republican predecessor (Henry L. Stimson) had refused to recognize the puppet State established by the Japanese in Manchuria. He made clear that this policy of nonrecognition was a matter of principle and wholly nonpartisan in American eyes. Then, as is set forth on page 16 of the current White Paper on United States Relations with China, Mr. Hull concluded:

> "In the opinion of the American people and the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavour to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states."

Time passed, but even at the obvious risk and eventual certainty of war both Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt stood firm on this clearly-expressed principle. The Japanese argued, as Secretary Acheson now asserts, that the regime of Chiang Kai-shek was "reactionary" and corrupt. For Japan to guide and supervise Chinese politics, said Tokyo, would be in the interest of world peace. We reiterated that: "Our Government . . . has rested its policy upon an abiding faith in the people of China and upon the ultimate success, in dealing with them, of the principles of fair play, patience and mutual goodwill."

The Japanese continued to protest that co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek, whom we were then backing so strongly, was impossible. Our current White Paper seems designed to prove that Tokyo was right and that Secretary Hull was wrong. On November 26, 1941, Mr. Hull informed Japan that its government must subscribe to "the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries". That virtual

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ultimatum, discreetly buried on pages 464-66 of the White Paper, was equally categorical on the subject of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. We laid it down, as an essential condition of peace in the Pacific area, that:

> "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support -- militarily, politically, economically -- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

This essentially moral policy was too rigidly based, and too forcefully stated, for acceptance by the Japanese war lords. Overestimating President Roosevelt's attachment to principle, and underestimating American physical strength, they gave the fatal order. On December 7, 1941, the bombs at Pearl Harbor obliterated that line between peace and war which was already virtually erased.

II

The war dragged on -- to its inevitable end. Italy surrendered; Germany crumbled; and by the beginning of 1945 the eventual defeat of Japan was also certain. But in the heat and fury of the struggle something was disintegrating in America too. It was the moral fiber of our leadership; it was the belief in principle.

This decadence in our foreign policy is discernible throughout the nearly eleven hundred pages of the current White Paper. And the evidence of degeneracy is the stronger because it was certainly not the intention of Secretary Acheson to advertise our own corruption. It is charged that some damaging documentary material has been left out. More significant is the fact that so much condemnatory evidence has been included. For this proves that our surrender of principle is an essential part of the record. The compilation, no matter how carefully edited, was bound to be shot through with appalling disclosures.

For instance, there is documentation on President Roosevelt's effort to force Chiang Kai-shek to accept General Stilwell as commander of all the Chinese military forces. Naturally this pressure was resisted by Chiang. It probably would have been resisted even if a more temperate character than Stilwell had been suggested, and even if the danger of Communist infiltration had been less obvious. But President Roosevelt was thinking only of "winning the war". And on August 23, 1944 -- as disclosed on page 67 of the White Paper -- he sent to Chiang Kai-shek the following self-revelatory message:

> "I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's command should be limited except by their availability to defend China and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to reject the aid of anyone who will kill Japanese."

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It is important to note the date of this observation by one who was acclaimed as a great humanitarian. For there is now a tendency to excuse the perfidy at Yalta by saying that the President was then a dying man. Actually this shameful Agreement, signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin on February 11, 1945, was merely the logical application of Roosevelt's thought in the preceding August. Principle was even then subordinated to the sadistic desire to "kill Japanese".

III

In 1934, Secretary Hull had firmly asserted that: "no nation can . . . rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where there are involved the rights . . . of other sovereign states".

That was the principle in defense of which the United States went to war. Yet at Yalta, when Japanese leaders were already seeking to negotiate surrender, Mr. Roosevelt tossed away not only the principle but also the physical fruits of victory. The text of the Yalta Agreement as to China, printed on pages 113-14 of the White Paper, cannot be too carefully studied. The secret concessions then made to Soviet Russia at Chinese expense insured the eventual triumph of the Chinese Communists and the rise of a threat to our Pacific interests more serious than anything ever offered by Japan.

This was the accomplishment, at Yalta, of Franklin Roosevelt, Ed Stettinius, Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, Alger Hiss and a couple more. Truly Mr. Churchill might then have said that never before had so many owed so much disaster to so few.

The State Department's current effort to exculpate and explain Yalta is really pathetic -- no other word will serve. For instance, the White Paper asserts (page 115) that: "There was historical precedent for the specific provisions of the Yalta Agreement." It does not emphasize that this historical precedent was the Czarist Russian aggression against China which led to the formulation of our "Open Door" policy just fifty years ago. What Mr. Roosevelt did was to tell Stalin that in his case the United States would underwrite a policy of aggression and infiltration which, in the case of the Czar, we had resolutely opposed. And this was done behind China's back!

Of course it was not long before the well-informed discerned the dreadful significance of Yalta. The White Paper tragically relates the effort of President Truman, soon after Roosevelt's death, to regain some of the values tossed away by his predecessor. On page 118 we read of

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instructions sent to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow, on August 22, 1945, telling him "as soon as possible" to get a written statement from Stalin "affirming respect for the Open Door policy". Of course no such statement was obtained.

IV

The White Paper on China, we are informed, was published by the Department of State at the insistance of General Marshall. The former Chief of Staff is said to be worried over the failure of his mission to China, from 1945 to 1947, and to desire personal justification.

But all that part of the White Paper is, of course, of secondary importance. At Yalta an American President in effect handed the control of China over to Soviet Russia. It was then that we actually administered the lethal dose to Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Even so, it took more than four years for the poison fully to undermine what Chiang had firmly built.

The White Paper does demonstrate -- at inordinate length -- that after Yalta a number of honorable men endeavored to check the operation of the poison we had administered. But whether General Hurley or General Marshall, or the far more able General Wedemeyer, did all that was then possible to save China from Communism is really of secondary importance. China was doomed at Yalta -- by a President of the United States -- on February 11, 1945. That day also will live in infamy.

Now the American people, like Hamlet, are beginning to find themselves forced to the realization of murder most foul. It is a reluctant realization. Indeed it is not yet widespread. We shall, for some time, seek alibis, as Hamlet did. But the best excuse we can offer officially is that Chiang Kai-shek temporized with corruption, as the Japanese said ten years ago. It is unfortunate that this excuse had to compete in the headlines with certain activities of General Vaughan.

The White Paper -- for any conscientious reader -- does not exculpate. On the contrary, it only pins the stigma closer to everyone of us. And while we may prefer to dodge the issue -- to dally with Ophelia, so to speak -- that will not serve. The Kremlin, for one, will not permit. It did not throw victory to the winds.

"To be, or not to be: that is the question." And suicide for a nation is not so complicated. It is merely a matter of officially approving and defending that which the individual moral sense can neither approve nor defend. Yalta cannot be defended on the dreadful basis of Mr. Roosevelt's lust to "kill Japanese". And well we know it.

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Book Events *A Supplement to* Human Events

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THE STATE OF LETTERS: A MIDSUMMER SURVEY

by J. M. Lalley

It is, I think, no great secret that the book-publishing trade has come upon unhappy times. There are apparently no trustworthy figures concerning the number of book sales throughout the country from year to year; but since there is, according to general practice, a certain ratio between the sale of copies of a particular book and the amount of money spent in advertising it, a tabulation that appeared in a recent issue of the Publishers' Weekly may afford a fairly reliable index. It was shown that since 1945 the annual totals of agate lines of newspaper advertising purchased by a dozen of the largest commercial publishers has diminished by a little more than 43 per cent.

There has been no decrease, however, in the variety of books published; last year, indeed, the number of new titles was larger than ever, but the classifications indicated some curious alterations of interest. There was less of what is called imaginative literature and a good deal more of what I suppose should be called instructive literature. There was a notable increase, for example, of books devoted to such subjects as medicine, law, science, history, sociology and economics. There is no doubt some relation here to the vast increase of enrollments in colleges, universities and technical schools under the veterans' scholarships, but this does not entirely explain the new interest manifested in works of philosophy and religion. Of the five books, exclusive of fiction, currently reported by booksellers to be most in demand, three have to do with some aspect of religion, and the reports are apparently confirmed by the records of successive printings.

At the best of times habitual book readers do not constitute more than a relatively slight minority of the whole population. This was true even in the great boom market for books in the earlier years of the decade now ending, when the demand for literature of every variety was such that almost anything that an editor could make intelligible or a proofreader could punctuate had a fair chance of finding a publisher. The book markets of those days were the products of special circumstances that no longer prevail, among them the plentifulness of money and the scarcity of other things to buy with it, the overcrowding of amusement places, the restrictions placed on travel by air or by motor car, the tedium of long uncomfortable journeys by train. Not only the quantity of literature but the very forms of it are affected by social change.

The more obvious economic factors that now hamper the activities of publishers are rising production costs and increased postal rates, both of which have necessarily affected the retail price of books. The growth and proliferation of book clubs, and the merchandising methods employed by them, have multiplied the woes of the retail booksellers. Some of the clubs, through their practice of gratuities and dividends, are able to offer their subscribers a year's supply of books for considerably less than the wholesale price the retail merchant must pay for the same books. In many places the practice of price-cutting that has so long plagued the trade continues, openly or surreptitiously. The effect of all this has been to make retailers, especially in the smaller cities, less and less willing to diversify their stocks. Since the bookseller's operating capacity is likely to be small, he

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must invest it in books that seem assured of a large and rapid sale. To help him determine which books these will be, special reviewing services have been established in which the new offerings are examined and judged solely from this point of view, and advance reports are dispatched concerning the decisions of book clubs, the size of preliminary printings and the effort to be expended in publicity and promotion. The psychology of the mass market has been further increased by the great growth of the popular reprint trade.

But neither the economic difficulties of publishers and booksellers nor the general depression of taste to the common denominator of a mass market, accounts for the present enervated state of American letters. Publishing is not even yet a wholly mercenary business, and it is improbable that a work of exceptional quality by an unknown author would go unrecognized or be generally rejected. Some publishers indeed defend the presence of prurient and profitable rubbish in their lists on the ground that it enables them to risk the publication of other books for which the only probable return will be aesthetic gratification or professional prestige. Even so, most of the writers thus brought to attention nowadays prove to be English or Irish or Continental Europeans. For though there are probably more young persons than ever in the United States who are writing or attempting to write, there are general and unmistakable evidences of spiritual and imaginative exhaustion among American writers of all ages. One symptom is the growing proportion of anthologies and new editions to original works, reflecting, as it seems, a disposition of the more fastidious readers to ignore contemporary literature entirely and to explore the resources of the past; but what we must consider is whether this willingness to live, so to speak, upon cultural capital, is not in itself a sign of decadence.

I shall not pretend to examine all the causes that have contributed to the present sterility of American letters. Beyond much doubt some of the blame belongs in the schools, where a deadly illusion persists among the pedagogues that imaginative literature is mainly a subject for laborious analysis and classification, where students are taught to dismantle and reassemble the narrative plots of masterpieces as though they were so many automotive engines. Another, and perhaps more serious, factor has been the disappearance of poetry as an active influence in American life. The practice of poetry has become a kind of exclusive lodge or fraternity protected from intrusion and from vulgar curiosity by incomprehensible passwords, exotic symbolisms and mysterious rituals celebrated in hieratic language in the pages of the highbrow quarterlies. It is fair to say that the greater part of contemporary poetry must remain unintelligible to all who are unwilling to submit themselves to a long season of preparation, purification and initiation, and to study such works as Mr. William P. Empson's Seven Types of Ambiguity, which is perhaps best described as an eighth.

In contrast to poetry the less occult phases of contemporary literature have become mere vehicles of political polemic. The readiness of modern writers and scholars to pervert themselves into propagandists and to absorb the passions of the forum and the marketplace was observed and lamented nearly a generation ago by M. Julien Benda in his famous condemnation of La Trahison des Clercs. Both Professor Brinton and the Reverend Lyford Edwards in their studies of social revolution as an historical phenomenon have mentioned this defection of artists and intellectuals from the service of the spirit as among the great preparatory factors. No one, at any rate, can longer doubt that writers, and more especially critics and reviewers, had much to do with the preparation of the atmosphere that prevailed in Washington and elsewhere in the days when professional revolutionaries were insinuating themselves with no great difficulty into places of power. The story of the curious alliance between American letters and Russian ambition has been related in some detail, though not perhaps without malice, in Mr. Eugene Lyons' history of The Red Decade. Among the unwitting victims of this alliance were many members of the

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social group which, according to some foreign observers, now exercises the determining influence over American thought and opinion; I mean the women of a certain age who seek relief from the pain of a prosperous leisure in the restless pursuit of culture, and who, like Mrs. Ballinger in the story, prefer for reasons of safety to pursue it in packs. They constitute a majority of the readers of book review pages and are the chief support of the book clubs, the circulating libraries and the lecture circuits. They have thus a special susceptibility to writers of reputation; and for a good many years before the recent war, so pervasive was the power of the revolutionary fantasy that reputations could be made or unmade, almost at will, by the party line inquisitors. Most of the writers and critics who in that epoch put their talents to the service of the party line made love to the employment; some merely succumbed to a general contagion, and still others were forced into line by various forms of intimidation, a few rebelled and were duly disciplined.

The end result has been a kind of general disenchantment among readers. There exists today a widespread distrust of writers as a class, and a disposition to search their work for evidences of concealed motives. Reviewers have come under even greater suspicion. The Communist influence though still powerful in the literary pages is no longer dominant; but the work of reviewing appears to have become divided among bigoted coteries. There is not in the United States any publication whose reviews command such general respect and confidence as those, for example, of the "Literary Supplement" of the Times of London.

To some extent the literary coteries reflect the divisions and antagonisms now evident in American Society itself, which have been greatly exacerbated by the recent course of international politics and by the prolonged war of nerves with Russia. A good example is provided in the tempest of controversy provoked early this year by the award of the first Bollingen prize in poetry to Mr. Ezra Pound, and now raging with accelerated fury in the literary periodicals. The prize was provided from a fund established by Mr. Paul Mellon and named in honor of the medico-mystical cult which centers about the person and residence of the famous psychoanalyst, Dr. Jung of Zurich. Neither Mr. Mellon nor Dr. Jung, however, had anything to do with the nomination of Mr. Pound for the prize; that was the work of the Fellows of the Library of Congress, a sort of quasi-official academy established during the tenure of Mr. Archibald MacLeish, and recruited apparently from the hyperaesthetic variety of poets and critics.

The recipient of the prize is under indictment for treason because of the aid and comfort presumed to have been derived by the late Signor Mussolini from Mr. Pound's wartime radio speeches. But having been adjudged insane by a court the poet has been committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital in Washington where he seems very likely to remain. The prize was given specifically for the poems called the Pisan Cantos, which though part of a larger opus upon which he has been engaged for many years, seem to have been composed during Mr. Pound's confinement in an American military prison camp in Italy, where from all accounts, including his own, he appears to have been rather harshly used by his captors. Like the previous Cantos these are written in a polyglot idiom which includes snatches of English, French, Provencal, Italian, Spanish, Greek, Latin, and what I take to be Classical Chinese. The sense is quite disjointed, so that we have actually a succession of unrelated epigrams, erudite puns, witticisms and obscure allusions to Mr. Pound's earlier life and acquaintanceships. The Swiss philosopher, Dr. Max Picard, who has described the Fascist mentality as a reflection of the nihilistic irrelevance of modern life, would, I suspect, find plenty of support for his thesis in the Cantos. But amid all the incoherence two things are quite evident; one is Mr. Pound's unreasoning hatred of the Jews, whom he supposes to have organized the war for purposes of profit; the other is his continued veneration of the late Duce, who, as the poet boasts, ended like a good short story, not with a whimper but a bang.

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It is not clear just what considerations guided the Bollingen judges; they were not unanimous, and among those who dissented were the Messrs. Karl Shapiro and Paul Green, though to be sure for somewhat different reasons. The announcement of the award, as though anticipating the controversy, was accompanied by a clumsily worded statement, which gave evidence of having been worked over by several hands, expressing the principle that the value of poetry must be judged apart from the character of the poet. As far as it goes, the principle seems to me unexceptionable. The private characters of many good poets, among them Villon and Byron, have been anything but exemplary. As for lunacy, it is after all the occupational disease of poets; indeed the ancients held all good poetry to be the product of a special form of madness called enthousia. As for anti-Semitic prejudice, evidences of it are also to be found in Chaucer and Shakespeare. Nor is Mr. Pound by any means the first poet to have been accused of treason; it has puzzled more than one historian that the government of Charles II neglected to hang John Milton. But when all this is said, there remains the fact that hardly more than a microscopic group of readers is capable of recognizing in Mr. Pound's Cantos whatever it was in them that moved the judges to admiration.

Some months later a savage attack on the Bollingen jury was unleashed by another poet, Mr. Robert Hillyer, in two essays published in the Saturday Review of Literature. He was seconded by the editors, who in a rather hysterical editorial pledged him support even though it might mean suffocation of their magazine under a mass of libel judgments. Almost any experienced journalist could have told them that a much more probable result would be a temporary stimulus to circulation. Mr. Hillyer accused the Bollingen judges among other things of insulting the war dead, and of being influenced like Mr. Pound and Dr. Jung, by anti-Semitic prejudice and Fascist sympathies. He was indeed a little reckless with facts, and some of his statements had afterwards to be amended or retracted by the editors, but there have been as far as I know no suits for libel damages.

Besides, it soon became clear that the real target of Mr. Hillyer's patriotic anger and indignation was not so much Mr. Pound as Mr. T. S. Eliot, who for more than a quarter of a century has been a highly venerated guru to poetical neophytes. He was suspected by Mr. Hillyer of having forced the decision by overawing his less eminent colleagues. Mr. Hillyer raised the interesting question, still unanswered, how Mr. Eliot, a British subject, happened to be nominated to a position of such influence in an institution supported by American taxpayers.

The stalwarts of the literary Left swung immediately into line behind Mr. Hillyer. They were joined by many disgruntled minor poets of no particular political persuasion whose manner of verse has gone out of fashion and who have long resented what they deem the reign of terror exercised on Parnassus by Mr. Eliot and his aesthetic police. Other poets and critics, however, have rallied openly or privately to the support of the judges, less, I suspect, out of any aesthetic enthusiasm for Mr. Pound, than simply from dislike and suspicion of the coteries that are supporting Mr. Hillyer. The excitement bids fair to continue for the rest of the year.

Thus we have a strange and possibly significant development; the use of political weapons in what is fundamentally conflict of aesthetic theory. It is an ironic reversal of the situation prevailing in the later 1930's when literary controversies were being used for purely political ends. It will be interesting to see what comes of it all. Meanwhile, one thing is certain; that except for the political implications very little public attention would have been given to the whole business.

NOT MERELY GOSSIP does not appear this week due to the absence of Frank C. Hanighen.

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European Supplement *to* Human Events Vol. VI, No. 33

By Bertrand de Jouvenel August 17, 1949

PARLIAMENT OF EUROPE: As I write these notes in Paris, on August 10, a group of 87 legislators, drawn from ten national Parliaments of Western Europe, are convened into one Assembly, meeting at Strasbourg.

By the time this letter comes into the hands of the reader, it should be apparent whether this date is to assume historical significance. An entirely novel assembly, called together for an unprecedented task, determines its status by the tone and style it adopts at the outset. If there be men within this body who have formed a very high idea of the Assembly's rôle and prerogative, and if they can fire their colleagues with their conception, then a great and majestic institution enters upon the scene of history. As Winston Churchill warns his fellow delegates at Strasbourg: "The whole future of this Assembly depends upon its attitude towards its fundamental rights."

The European press carried very little advance comment on this European Assembly, and left public opinion almost unaware of the event, which falls at the peak of the holiday season. Even people who should know better were apt to confuse this official undertaking with the private conventions in behalf of "European Union".

This poor publicity was seemingly due to the impression, prevailing among specialized correspondents, that the Assembly was to be a very minor body, appended to the meeting of Foreign Ministers and held on a leading string by them. Spokesmen for the Foreign Ministers fostered this impression. And it is true that the agenda of the Assembly was arranged for it by the Ministers and that its recommendations are to be taken as mere advice, which the Ministers may wholly disregard.

But what has been generally overlooked is that the Assembly may move out of this subservience, can assert itself, and is free to claim a dignity, independence and power which it has not been granted. When the Ministers of Louis XVI called together the States General, they intended that this body should be docile and subservient, discuss the matters submitted to it, and disperse when the Monarch saw fit. It was no part of their plan that one of the component parts, the delegation of the Third Estate, should set itself up as the National Assembly, and declare itself the source of laws and of power. Nor did public opinion at large expect this, in 1789.

The ancient Constitution of France was practically overthrown in the very first days of this Assembly -- by its refusal to accept the name and character planned by the Ministers, by its bold adoption of a name consonant with the character the Assembly claimed, and by a consistent upholding of this character. Before the French Assembly of 1789 would deal with the concrete problems confronting the State, it insisted upon recognition of its authority. Apparently petty quarrels of form revealed in the Assembly a sense of conviction which was to drive it to the position of sovereign power. In order to regard itself as the representative of the nation it had to overcome far more legal obstacles than the Strasbourg Assembly would find in its way should it claim to be representative of the European people as a whole.

In 1789, ideas of popular sovereignty and of representation were not established in their present form. The delegates of the Third Estate were severally representatives of various groups of citizens, to whom they were respectively bound by imperative mandates. The delegates themselves decided that these mandates were invalid and that each was a representative of the whole nation.

Today, the Strasbourg delegates are representatives of national Parliaments, which in contemporary Europe are regarded as sovereign. But the men now meeting at

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Strasbourg could easily claim that the sovereignty of ten nations is blended in their Parliament. This notion of representation is a fiction which takes on flesh when there is an underlying reality to be crystallized, and a genuine political desire seeking expression.

Should the Strasbourg delegates proclaim that they are "the people of Western Europe in Congress assembled", and swear not to separate without giving a federal constitution to Western Europe, who could or would stop them? And public opinion would be shaken from skepticism into enthusiasm. For the attitude of the average European is: "European Union would be a good thing but it won't happen." This one hears continuously. An audacious act of leadership would command enormous support.

And it is not true that progress in this direction will be achieved gradually. It is not being achieved. The blending of any services must wound some susceptibilities. The opening of any frontier must injure some vested interests. European governments are now too weak to overcome opposition which may pay lip service to the principle of Union, but surreptitiously opposes its operation. In order to crush such opposition they would have to be very strong governments indeed; and strong governments are strong not only to work good but also to work evil.

But history shows that a wholly new body, like your Philadelphia Convention of 1787, can overcome such opposition. An assembly fired by vision and uninhibited by facts has its own well-known dangers, but is also capable of heroic achievement.

Will the Strasbourg delegates be bold, or just good boys? It is generally assumed that they will play around in the nursery allotted to them.

* * *

THE FORGOTTEN EUROPE: The Strasbourg delegates must at least express their concern over Eastern Europe; define the sense of amputation resulting from the westward advance of Communist domination. When France, in 1871, was defeated and defenseless the National Assembly at Bordeaux had spirit enough to voice a vigorous protest against the severance of Alsace and Lorraine. It is not to be believed that the Strasbourg Assembly will be less forthright.

Indeed it is time to emphasize the subject of Eastern Europe. Silence on this subject has become immoral. In Europe those politicians who deemed it prudent not to dwell upon German conduct in Austria and Czechoslovakia are still branded, but many among their accusers are now their imitators. Further, silence on the subject of Soviet tyranny drives the "Atlantic Powers" into a position of absurdity. The defense of Europe is now being attended to, one hears. Obviously if the plan is to undertake merely a retarding action on the Continent, and to defend only the British Isles, then it is neither fair nor reasonable to expect a great military effort from the Continental nations and it is unwise to place American weapons where they may fall into enemy hands.

In order to promote real European and Atlantic co-operation, it is necessary that the Atlantic Powers should undertake the defense of Continental Western Europe. But can this rump territory be defended on the Rhine? The answer is no. Aside from the stupidity of abandoning the Ruhr, it is well known that modern warfare demands a lot of space to back into. Russia was saved in 1942 by mere space. The breadth of France is shockingly insufficient: it can be spanned in an hour by modern planes. Defense on the Rhine is such a bad risk that the British there must always be thinking of retreat; that the Americans must be reluctant about defending such a precarious bridgehead; and that the Continentals themselves will be chary of building up armies for presumably futile outpost duty.

It therefore seems to be a prerequisite of confidence, and of the present defensive effort, that the line of defense should be pushed eastwards. The Elbe is better than the Rhine, but far better is the line from the Baltic to the Carpathians. In short, the building up of Western defense demands that the Russian vanguards be pushed back.

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Fellow travellers have had much play with the fable of Soviet anxiety, the "psychosis of fear" which was said to explain Russia's aggressive behavior. In order to alleviate this neurosis, the Kremlin had to be allowed to surround herself with a ring of slave States. The real psychosis of fear today is in Western Europe. This alone explains why some two hundred and fifty million people, with great military traditions and technically superior to the Russians, find it necessary to call for American protection. In order to alleviate this psychosis of fear, which causes not aggressiveness but paralysis, it is essential to extend freedom eastwards.

Your correspondent is in full sympathy with those Americans who are increasingly annoyed by our ceaseless demands for protection. Europe should certainly pull its weight in the Atlantic association. The reason why she does not do so is that the Russians camp over half of Europe. If this were remedied, the United States would doubtless find Europe capable of adding to American security, instead of being a mere burden.

* * *

MARSHALL FOR EVER? British officials estimate that Britain will this year need some 20 per cent more Marshall dollars than was granted in the first year of aid. This has been a shock to Europe, and is regarded as a rout of the Labor Party planners who had held that 25 per cent less would suffice. The revision of British estimates has given rise to much acid recrimination in the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, though it should in fairness be said that were grants allotted between the Marshall countries on the basis of pre-war total imports, England's share would come out as one-third of the whole.

Far more important than such controversies is the belated realization that recovery in terms of production does not of itself close the dollar gap. Excepting Germany, the production of Western Europe is now well above pre-war levels. This in 1949, and yet there is no hope in the breasts of the experts that even three years hence Europe will be able to do without American financial support.

It is much to be regretted that the O.E.E.C. is doing so little to publicize the actual European economic situation for Europeans. When in April, 1948, the civil servants and Ministers of the 16 countries were provided with a permanent meeting place in Paris, and endowed with a competent and numerous staff, it seemed that one of the main activities of this body would be to circularize a constant stream of data and information on the state of Europe, to feed and stimulate discussion on the problems of Europe. In this way it could have quickened public attention and prepared the ground for measures found necessary to improve the situation.

It is somewhat disquieting that Americans are being told more, through the agency of the E.C.A., about the situation of Europe than are the Europeans themselves. The assumption in Europe seems to be that the problem is a technical one, to be coped with at expert level. The result is that policies are a mongrel outcome of administrative decisions, by-passing public discussion, and of political pressures by parties and groups ignorant of the over-all situation.

It is too easily assumed in Europe that everything that can be done to close the "dollar gap" is being done and that the outcome, whatever it may be, is foreordained -- a theory which is being gradually hammered into a scientific thesis. It runs like this: the dollar gap is chronic, a historical phenomenon beyond the reach of men, due to the substitution of the United States for Britain as hub of world trade. This means that a country naturally self-sufficient has replaced an import-hungry country. While England, in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, bought a hundred pounds worth for every seventy she sold, the United States, a hundred years later, buys less than sixty dollars' worth for every hundred it sells. And while England's private foreign investments amounted to 7 per cent of her national income forty years ago, American private investments amount to less than half of one per cent. Thus dollar famine is inevitable and chronic.

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This is the thesis which is being systematized, and the UN Commission for Europe has very ably set it forth. But there is another way of looking at things, set forth in the report of the Basle Bank of International Settlements, which represents the external disequilibrium of European countries as the outcome of internal disequilibrium. It is pleasing to find that this more virile view is adopted by the Belgian, French and Italian governments. But it is not publicized. Surely this explains why American travellers on the Continent are struck by the indifference of citizens to vital problems, said to be too difficult and too intricate for the ordinary citizen. There is a consequent danger that they will be expounded and grossly misrepresented by some demagogic movement or other.

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THE CHANCE FOR PROGRESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: It is plain that European public opinion is drifting away from all collectivist philosophies. It is not moving in any perceivable direction. It is not being called to rally around a liberal banner. At a time when propaganda is temporarily in abeyance, the opportunity is not vigorously seized of restoring the habit of rational discussion. Except in the top layers of public men and lobbyists, there is little discussion or knowledge of public affairs: this applies to the Continent, not to England. This situation clamors for a great campaign of political re-education.

The gains of truly Liberal parties in the Swedish, the Belgian and now the German elections testify to the public's desire to get away from collectivist philosophies. But the Liberals themselves are in many cases unsure of their own principles and moreover they seldom find themselves in sufficient numbers to apply their ideas. Instead they must frequently share power with their intellectual opponents, an obligation which does not allow true Liberalism to make its position clear. A striking example of this situation is to be found in France where M. Queuille, whose merits have been noticed in this letter from the very outset of his government, is paralyzed by his Socialist Ministers, often abetted by the Popular Republicans.

For instance, in the last weeks, his Socialist Minister of Labor mocked the Liberal principle of equality of rights between citizens, and asserted against it the Socialist principle of privilege. In order to keep his government together, M. Queuille had to support his Minister against the protests of the House and the press. The issue was a simple one. All French government employees enjoy paid holidays, but in favor of those administering "social security", the Minister of Labor thought fit to add a certain sum, first called a "premium" and then an "indemnity". As a witty journalist said, the Minister first thought his pet employees had to be offered an inducement to leave their desks, then decided they had to be indemnified for the bother and trouble of the vacation crush. This was a privilege granted to those who run "social security" as against other workers.

Our honorable Prime Minister is powerless against such practices, odious to him, for he presides over a composite cabinet supported by a composite majority, which does not even reflect the majority of opinion in the country. In France, at least, the strength of the various brands of collectivism was due less to a movement of opinion than to the capture of strategic positions by the allied forces of the three more or less collectivist groups at the time of Liberation. There is no doubt that public opinion would now support a stronger Liberal policy than that practiced. This sets the problem of vigor in Liberalism, as opposed to Socialism.

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Your White Book on China has caused a stir of astonishment in Paris. It is unusual to hold an inquest on so recent an ally. And there are some here who wonder whether the European countries may not be one day the subject of another such book.

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